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Over the past two decades both developed 
and developing countries have implemented 
pension reforms. Reasons for reform include 
demographic transitions (with increasing life 
expectancies and growing elderly 
populations in many countries), labor market 
changes (with expanding informal sectors 
cutting into the payroll taxes needed to 
finance pension systems), and actuarial and 
financial imbalances of pension systems 
becoming more widespread due to the first 
two developments. Pension reforms must be 
handled carefully, because they may affect 
the income distribution between generations 
and among groups in the same generation.  
 
Reform has been more successful in 
countries that have more homogeneous 
societies and that do not have a history of 
providing privileges to certain groups. By 
contrast, reform has been slow and painful 
in countries with political and representative 
systems unable to produce stable majorities 
in their congresses and where traditions 
related with heterogeneous and segmented 
pension systems have created political 
lobbies against reforms and impeded a clean 
political transition. In Italy, for example, 
these obstacles have stalled pension reforms 
started in the first half of the 1990s.  
 
In Brazil most pensions are under the 
umbrella of a pay as you go (PAYG) 
system. Unlike many developed countries 
and even more than most other developing 
countries, Brazil also has a large, socially 
inclusive, noncontributory system that 
requires huge fiscal resources to finance 
expected benefits. In addition, there is a 
generous scheme for civil servants, as well 
as schemes that complement the coverage 
provided by the others. There is, however, 
considerable inequity among the benefits 
provided by these four main pension 
schemes. Thus pension reform in Brazil 
must both increase the coverage of the 
contributory schemes and reduce the 
inequity between the general pay as you go 
scheme and the privileged civil servant 
scheme.  
 
In 1998 the Brazilian government 
implemented reforms to increase the 
financial sustainability of its pension 
schemes—seeking to contain pension 
deficits without hurting acquired rights. 
Changes to the pay as you go scheme 
included establishing a mechanism that 
defines benefits based on workers’ ages and 
length of contributions, as well as raising the 
minimum retirement age for civil servants. 
 
Despite these reforms, the country’s pension 
schemes continued to generate rising 
deficits. So, in the second half of 2003 the 
administration of President Luis Ignacio 
(Lula) Silva introduced new reforms aimed 
at equalizing the more generous civil servant 
benefits with those offered by the general 
pay as you go system. These reforms were 
driven by the fact that the government was 
incurring R$50 billion a year in deficits to 
sustain high pensions for fewer than 3 
million retired civil servants when it lacked 
resources to extend health and education 
coverage to poor citizens.  
 
Reforms to the civil servant pension system 
are expected to cut the public deficit by 0.3–
0.5 percent of GDP a year over the next five 
years and by more than 1.0 percent of GDP 
a year beyond that. These savings imply that 
while the civil servant system will continue 
to carry a sizable deficit over the medium 
term, it should decline over the long term. 
This chapter analyzes Brazil’s pension  
2 
systems, focusing on the scheme for civil 
servants—including the need for and 









The Brazilian pension system was originally 
developed along the same lines as those in 
other Latin American countries. The first 
pension schemes started in the early 20
th 
century,
1 with coverage increasing during 
the industrialization and economic 
development processes that spanned the 
1930s to the 1960s. Those schemes, 
organized as pay as you go funds and 
managed mostly by the public sector, were 
unified in 1967 into a single fund managed 
by a new public institute (which in 1976 
became the National Institute for Social 
Security - INSS) in an effort to achieve 
greater scale economies, increase equity, 
and improve financial administration. 
Unification did not, however, include the 
pension schemes for civil servants and 
military personnel, which retained 
independent administrations—guaranteeing 
many privileges for members. 
 
Between the 1967 reform and the 1988 
Constitution, few changes occurred in the 
administration of pension schemes for 
public and private employees. The most 
important change was the introduction, 
                                                       
1 The first pension law in Brazil (the Eloy Chaves 
Law), issued in 1923, covered railroad employees. 
Using the same model, many other profession-based 
pension schemes were created in the 1920s, including 
for commercial activities, public services, industry, 
and bank employees. By the end of the 1920s there 
were more than two hundred pension funds. In 1934 
Getúlio Vargas’s government increased the state’s 
role in managing the pension system, creating seven 
public pension institutions—organized by branch of 
activity—that took on most of the contributors to the 
profession-based schemes.  
 
during the 1970s, of a noncontributory 
pension for elderly and handicapped persons 
lacking means to survive. In addition, in an 
effort to avoid short-term financial shocks in 
the early 1980s, the government made some 
adjustments to the pay as you go system for 
private employees. Those adjustments, 
based on parametric changes such as 
increasing contribution rates and capping or 
reducing benefits, did not change the 
structural trend of the pay as you go system 
toward a growing deficit.  
 
A conceptual change to pension system rules 
was introduced with the 1988 Constitution, 
which defines a national social security 
system that guarantees all Brazilian citizens 
access to pensions, health care, and social 
assistance. The new pension system focuses 
on protecting people against poverty—
especially those who lose their work 
capacity due to aging, health conditions, or 
disability, or who suffer the death of a 
spouse or parent (for children under 21). But 
this new conceptual framework did not 
introduce substantial changes in the way that 
Brazilian pension schemes were organized. 
It merely consolidated existing financing 
mechanisms,
2 solidified civil servants’ 
privileges, and consolidated rights for 
noncontributing workers and the poorest 
elderly populations.  
 
                                                       
2 Under the new social security system, pensions are 
financed by payroll contributions; health care by 
taxes applied on gross sales, and social assistance by 
the net profit of firms and the financial sector.   
3 
Previously to 1998, the Brazilian pension 
system is composed of four schemes:  
 
•  A noncontributory pension for rural 
workers, disabled people, and others, 
with eligibility based on age (70 for 
men, 65 for women) or disability. This 
scheme, created in the 1970s, pays a 
monthly means-tested allowance 
equivalent to the Brazilian minimum 
wage (US$80) and is managed by 
National Institute for Social Security. It 
guarantees old age pensions for workers 
who spent their entire lives in the 
informal labor market, especially in rural 
areas. 
 
•  A mandatory public pay as you go 
pension for private workers, financed by 
payroll contributions. This scheme 
includes cross-subsidies to the poor and 
is based on defined benefits, with a 
monthly ceiling of R$1,562 (US$558 in 
June 2003). Minimum benefits are 
equivalent to the minimum wage. The 
system is also managed by the INSS. 
Employee contributions range from 8–11 
percent of payroll, based on wage level. 
Employers contribute a flat 20 percent of 
payroll. The government contributes 
earmarked taxes to finance 
administrative costs, defray deficits, and 
cover contributions for employees of 
state enterprises. A 1998 reform to this 
scheme rose the minimum retirement 
age (from 53 to 60 for men and 48 to 55 
for women) and extended the length of 
contributions (from 108 to 180 months). 
Compulsory retirement ages will be 70 
for men and 65 for women after a 
transition period running from 1998 until 
2011. During the transition, pensions 
will be based on the length of 
contributions, age, and years from 
implementation of the new rules.  
 
•  A mandatory scheme for civil servants, 
managed by federal, state, and municipal 
governments and by the armed forces 
and police. This scheme guarantees 
pensions equivalent to the worker’s last 
salary before retirement. Pensions 
require 30 years of service for women 
and 35 for men, though beneficiaries can 
receive pensions equivalent to 80 
percent of the last salary with 25 years of 
service for women and 30 for men. 
Previous time spent at a private job can 
be counted toward the service 
requirement—civil servants need to 
prove just one year of public service to 
receive the benefit. Until the 1998 
reform neither civil servants nor the 
government (as employer) helped 
finance the system. All benefits were 
funded entirely by the public budget. 
The 1998´s reform required civil 
servants to pay 11 percent of their 
salaries to be enrolled in the system. In 
2003 additional reforms were made to 
this scheme, witch will be described 
below. 
 
•  Complementary pension funds, which 
are optional, privately managed, mostly 
centered on capitalization, fairly 
regulated, and monitored by the Ministry 
of Social Security and Ministry of 
Finance. These schemes do not have 
standardized contribution rates or 
benefits. The benefits complement pay 
as you go pensions to a predefined 
ceiling, based on the rules for each 
pension fund. Most of these funds enroll 
only employees of the same company. 
Large companies in strategic sectors 
(electricity, oil, banks, 
telecommunications, steel production 
and decentralized public enterprises or 
institutions) account for most of the 
participants in this scheme.  
  
4 
Figure 1 - Distribution of beneficiaries of brazilian pension 
system according the pension income 
2002 (in minimum wages groups)
Fontes: Boletim Estatístico da Previdência Social
Elaboração: SPS/MPS























































More than three quarters of beneficiaries 
earn monthly less than US$160 in benefits
As noted, the main purpose of this chapter is 
to analyze the structure, problems, and 
policies of the civil servant pension system, 
and all other sections are dedicated to those 
issues. To complement that analysis, the rest 
of this section describes some of the features 




According to the 1999 National Household 
Survey (PNAD 1999), 26.7 million workers 
were private employees contributing to the 
pay as you go scheme and 4.8 million were 
public servants (civil and military) working 
for central, state, and municipal 
governments. Another 40.2 million 
workers—56 percent of the labor force—do 
not contribute to any system. Those workers 
are candidates to achieve the old age 
benefits of the noncontributory scheme if 
nothing happens to improve their 
occupational conditions.  
 
In 2002 the pension schemes managed by 
Brazil’s federal government paid benefits to 
21 million beneficiaries.  
As shown in figure 1, two-thirds of 
beneficiaries receive less than the minimum 
wage and more than three-quarters earn 
monthly benefits of less than US$160.  
 
Even so, the Brazilian pension system, 
especially the noncontributory scheme, 
helps alleviate poverty. The population 
below the poverty line would be greater, 
especially among disabled and elderly 
populations, if the noncontributory pension 
did not exist. 
 
Among 15 Latin American countries, Brazil 
has some of the broadest pension coverage 
for people over 60. Only Argentina and 
Uruguay cover larger portions of the urban 
elderly, and Brazil has the highest coverage 
of the rural elderly (table 1). This system has 
been important in containing rural-urban 
migration and increasing the income of the 
poorest families, especially in rural areas.   
5 
MANDATORY PAY AS YOU GO 
SYSTEM 
 
Between 1994 and 2002 the number of rural 
pensioners increased from 5.8 to 6.9 million. 
The number of urban pensioners increased 
even faster. Several government changes on 
the pensions regulation, designed to avoid 
future problems in the compulsory pension 
scheme —such as increasing the length of 
required contributions and the retirement 
age and reducing the value of pensions—led 
many workers to retire earlier than expected. 
As a result the number of urban 
beneficiaries in the mandatory pay as you go 
scheme increased from 9.4 to 14.3 million 
between 1994 and 2002, in a context of low 
economic growth and increasing informal 
labor. 
Many variables indicate that Brazil’s 
compulsory pension system is approaching a 
crisis. Demography is no longer favorable to 
generous pension systems. Since the late 
1950s Brazil has experienced a rapid 
demographic transition, resulting in a drastic 
reduction in population growth (from 3.0 
percent a year in the 1960s to 1.4 percent in 
the 1990s). It is expected that around 2010–
20, demographic growth will reach the 
population replacement  level. In addition, 
fertility rates in Brazil fell from 4.3 children 
per woman of reproductive age in 1960 to 
1.9 in 2000, and are expected to be around 
1.4 in 2040. Additional life expectancy at 
age 60 is 18 years and at 70 is about 11 
years. 
 
Table 1 - Pension coverage for people 60 and over and average monthly pension values in 15 Latin 
American countries, 1997 
Coverage (percent)  Value (multiples of country poverty 
line) 
Country 
Urban Rural  Urban  Rural 
Argentina 67    2.3   
Bolivia 26  4  2.6  2.5 
Brazil 62  75  3.2  1.7 
Chile 61  48  3.5  2.8 
Colombia 20  9  3.5  3.1 
Costa Rica  40  19  3.5  3.1 
Dominican Republic  16    2.9   
Ecuador 17    2.0   
El Salvador  18  3  2.2  1.7 
Honduras 8  2  1.2  1.2 
Mexico 23  7  1.3  1.6 
Nicaragua 17    1.1   
Panama 48  19  4.6  5.0 
Paraguay 21    2.6   
Uruguay 81    3.3   
Average 39  21  2.6  2.0 
Source: CEPAL 2001, based on household surveys. 
  
6 
F Fi ig gu ur re e   2 2   P Po op pu ul la at ti io on n   p py yr ra am mi id ds s   i in n   B Br ra az zi il l, ,   1 19 98 80 0– –2 20 05 50 0   
( (m mi il ll li io on n   o of f   p pe eo op pl le e) )   
Source: IBGE Demographic Census (several years) 
Elaboration: SPS/MPS 
1980 
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1995  1996  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Net Revenues  Expenditures with Benefits Deficit
Fonte: INSS 
Elaboração: SPS/MPS 
Figure 3  - Net revenues, expenditures with benefit 
And deficits in Brazilian PAYG system (R$ billion 
1995-2002 
Over the next 50 years the Brazilian 
population will age significantly (figure 2). 
Consequently, dependency ratios will 
decrease as well.
3 Within the next 20 years 
the dependency ratio will likely fall below 2, 
and by 2030 it will be almost 1—meaning 
that just 1–2 workers will contribute to 
sustain each retiree or pensioner under the 
PAYG system. .  
 
Moreover, the informal labor market grew 
considerably during the 1990s, narrowing 
the possibility of maintaining financial 
sustainability in the pay as you go scheme. 
As a share of the labor force, the formal 
labor market fell from 50 percent in 1994 to 
45 percent in 2002. 
 
During the 1990s these demographic and 
labor markets trends led to growing deficits 
in the compulsory pay as you go system 
(figure 3). Since 1995 benefit expenses have 
exceeded payroll contributions, and by 2002 
                                                       
3 During the 1970s the dependency ratio of Brazil’s 
pay as you go scheme was about 4 (meaning 4 
contributors for each retiree or pensioner), but by 
2000 it was around 2. 
 
the deficit had reached R$17 billion (about 
US$6.0 billion). (Part of this deficit is due to 
the noncontributory system, which should be 
accounted separately.) Without changes, the 
deficit of the compulsory pay as you go 
system is expected to grow from 1.3 percent 
of GDP in 2002 to 1.7 percent in 2020, 
assuming moderate annual economic growth 
of about 2 percent. If economic growth is 
slower, the deficit will be even larger. Thus 
steps need to be taken to achieve future 
financial equilibrium in the pay as you go 
scheme. 
Part of the pension deficit is due to fiscal 
rules that forgo the collection of RS$8 
billion a year—almost half of the annual 
deficit. Those rules provide unfair privileges 






                                                       
4 The PAYG system exempts or reduces tax 
contributions for philanthropic organizations, rural 
employers and employees, domestic employees, 
professional soccer clubs and associations, and 
others.  
8 
COMPLEMENTARY PENSION FUNDS 
 
Brazil is among the few Latin American 
countries with voluntary private pension 
funds. Most complementary pension funds 
in Brazil are linked with capitalization 
schemes. The first such funds were created 
in the 1960s. Since then, several regulations 
have improved their portfolios and 
performance. The most recent regulation 
(Law 109, issued in May 2001) established 
two types of operating arrangements for 
these funds: closed entities, represented by 
employees of a company or groups of 
companies with specific collective benefits 
drawn for that group, and open entities, 
accessible to whoever subscribes and defray 
their own benefit plan.  
 
In 2002 the number of participants in 
complementary pension funds reached 1.7 
million, with 4.3 million dependents and 0.6 
million retirees. Enrollees represent less than 
4 percent of the Brazilian population. Still, 
these funds play an important economic 
role, especially in increasing the country’s 
long-term savings. Between 1990 and 2002 
the assets of complementary funds increased 
from 2.2 percent to 14.3 percent of GDP, or 
more than US$68 billion. Most assets are 
held in investment funds (50 percent), stocks 
(19 percent), and public bonds (12 percent).  
 
Although complementary pension funds 
need a few regulatory adjustments,
5 these 
adjustments will probably not be made until 
after the changes needed in the mandatory 
PAYG scheme. As complementary 
institutions, these funds need to adjust their 
benefit schemes in line with the shape 
defined by the pay as you go system. 
 
                                                       
5 Most needed adjustments are related to 
administration costs, insurance premiums, asset 
portfolio composition (especially regarding the 
possibility of allowing  foreign  investments), and 
nature of benefits (defined contribution versus 
defined benefit or mixed schemes). 
MAIN SHORT-TERM CONCERNS 
FOR BRAZIL’S PENSION SYSTEM 
 
The main risk facing the Brazilian pension 
system is the deficit in the PAYG scheme. 
This deficit has been increasing since the 
mid-1990s, and the 1998 pension reform 
was unable to avert this trend. 
 
Brazil’s pension system is fragmented and 
has little integration among its four main 
schemes. This situation leads to coverage 
duplications. Many people accumulate rights 
to pensions as both private employees and 
civil servants. Even many civil servants earn 
two or more pensions simultaneously when 
they retire as federal and state or municipal 
employees. The 1998 reform forbade such 
accumulation. 
 
There is enormous disparity in the benefit 
rules and requirements for different kinds of 
employees—especially for civil servants, 
who are a privileged group. And among civil 
servants, some groups (such as members of 
Congress and judiciary employees) receive 
pensions higher than their last salaries. This 
situation increases social inequity. 
 
The Brazilian government has tried, at 
different points in recent history, to 
introduce reforms to reduce privileges and 
increase the system’s long-run 
sustainability. But the reforms implemented 
in the 1990s did not achieve much. Interest 
groups, such as civil servant and trade 
unions, exerted pressure to keep privileges 
and avoid the rational solutions needed for a 










Public employees can be registered as civil 
servants or contracted under the private pay 
as you go system. In 1995 around 87 percent 
of federal, 67 percent of state, and 54 
percent of municipal public employees were 
civil servants. According to constitutional 
rules, the hiring process for civil servants is 
provided by public competition. Once 
approved, selected and hired, civil servants 
have special rights, including a different 
pension system.  
 
The civil servant pension scheme in Brazil is 
a complex chain of national and local 
systems (and interests) that includes many 
federal employee categories (executive, 
legislative, judiciary, armed forces) at 
different government levels; 27 state 
pension systems (including the Federal 
District) with the same complexity of the 
federal level, only replacing the armed 
forces with state police (civil and military); 
and employees of 2,140 municipalities.
6 The 
pension systems for these categories are 
regulated under law issued in the beginning 
of the 1990s, (Regime Jurídico Único, or 
RJU) created to protect all civil servants 
nationwide under almost the same basic 
rules. 
                                                       
6 Public employees of state companies, foundations, 
and the other 3,150 municipalities are not protected 
by the RJU. 
The total number of civil servants protected 
by RJU rules is unknown, but in 1999—
taking into account the federal, state, and 
state capital levels—there were 3.7 million 
active employees in the system, 1.7 million 
retirees, and almost 1.0 million pensioners 
(table 2).
7 The dependency ratio is higher at 
the federal level, reflecting the smaller 
number of active employees relative to 
retirees and pensioners. At the state and 
municipal levels the dependency ratios are 
more reasonable. Still, there is not much 
confidence in the future sustainability of 
those systems.  
 
The main advantages of pension rules for 
civil servants are: 
 
•  Higher pension value. Given the same 
length of service, civil servants receive 
pensions equivalent to the last salary 
received. Private employees receive 
pensions calculated as an average of the 
36 highest monthly salaries in the five 
years before retirement, limited by a 
ceiling of 10 times the minimum wage 
(about US$1,200).  
 
                                                       
7 Brazilian rules define retirees as former workers 
receiving a pension and pensioners as widows or 
dependents of dead retirees.  
 
Table 2 Employees, retirees, and pensioners in the civil servant pension scheme, 1999 









Federal  852.0 532.6 401.3  0.91 
State 2,561.0  1,035.6 514.2  1.65 
State capitals  332.1 93.2 44.4 2.41 
Total 3,745.1  1,661.4  959.9  - 
Source: Brazil, Ministry of Social Security, 2002.  
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•  Shorter contributions to achieve a 
full pension. Civil servants have to 
prove that they worked just 10 years 
as public employees to achieve a 
pension equivalent to the last salary. 
(The remaining 25 years could be 
accounted as a worker or self-
employed enrolled in the PAYG 
system.) The monthly amount of all 
fees and commissions received 
during over five years of work as 
civil servant when the time is fully 
incorporated in the monthly benefit 
value.  
Table 4 shows the combined payroll income, 
spending, and deficit of the civil servant 
pension scheme for the federal, state, and 
municipal levels (including police and 
military) during 1995–2002. Deficits have 
been growing, reaching 4.2 percent of GDP 
in 2002. Most of these deficits resulted from 
the absence of civil servant contributions 
until 1998, when a contribution of 11 
percent of payroll was established. Deficits 
have also risen as a result of slow GDP 
growth in a context of moderate expansions 
in benefit spending due to the aging of civil 
servants and the consequent increase in 
retirees and pensioners.  
Table 3 Differences of pension rules for civil servants relative to private employees 
Type of benefit  Private employees 
(Constitutional amendment 20, December 
1998) 
Civil servants (Constitutional amendment 
20, December 1998) 
Pension by length 
of service 
Transitional rules: 
a)  Contribution period: 35 years 
(men) and 30 years (women) 
b)  Minimum age: 53 (men) and 48 
(men) 
Post-transitional rules: 
a) Same   
b)  Minimum age: 60 (men) and 55 
(women) 
 
Benefit value: 80 percent of the average 
of the 36 highest monthly salaries in the 




Ceiling of benefit value: R$1,200 in 


















Ceiling of benefit value: none 
Pension by age  60 years (men) and 55 years (women)  Same 
Length of service 
to get the benefits 
assured by the 
system 
35 years (men) and 30 years (women)  10 years (to get the last salary benefit) 
and 5 years (to incorporate fees and 
commissions for management positions). 
The remaining 25 years can be spent as 
a worker or self-employed enrolled in the 
pay as you go system 
Benefit value 
parity with salaries 
of active 
employees 
Benefits actualized based on specific 
price indexes for retired people 
Full parity with salaries of active 
employees 
 
a. The provisional factor is a formula used to calculate the benefit value at the time an individual retires, based on age and length 
of contributions. 
b. The government has proposed raising the ceiling to R$2,400 to restore the original reference value of 10 minimum wages. 
Source: RJU Law and Regulations 
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Federal  57 89 18 
States  36 78 13 
Municipalities 7  87  3 
Total/average 100  85   
Source: Brazil, Ministerio da Fazenda, 2003. 
The federal government has always argued 
that the system deficit is a consequence of 
generous benefits and low employee payroll 
taxes. But the government has never 
defined, calculated, or made explicit the 
contributions to be paid by governments (as 
employers) as a counterpart of civil servant 
contributions. Some analysts claim that even 
if the government contribution were twice 
the size of the civil servant payroll tax, the 
system would still run a deficit. But the 
current situation most likely never would 
have occurred if financing rules had been 
defined earlier. Pay as you go systems must 
have independency, transparent accounts 
and clear mechanisms to finance benefits 
and identify deficit trends. That never 
happened with Brazil’s civil servant pension 
system. 
 
Each level of government experiences 
different outcomes from the system’s 
performance and has different motivations 
for supporting reforms. Table 5 shows that 
the weight and dimension of the deficit 
differ at each level of government. Though 
the federal deficit is larger than that at other 
government levels, in all cases the deficit 
represents a large proportion of spending on 
the pension system. Another way to analyze 
the deficit is as a share of fiscal revenues. In 
2000 the federal government spent 18 
percent of its revenues financing the civil 
servant pension deficit. State governments 
spent 13 percent, and municipalities just 3 
percent. Given these variations, it is useful 
to analyze the performance, issues, and 
needs of the civil servant pension scheme at 
the federal, state, and municipal levels. 
 
Table 4 Payroll income, benefit spending, and deficit of the civil servant pension scheme 
1995–2002 
Payroll income  Benefit spending  Deficit  Year 
R$ billions  Percentage 
of GDP 
R$ billions  Percentage 
of GDP 
R$ billions  Percentage 
of GDP 
1995 6.2  1.0  25.4 3.9  19.2 3.0 
1996 6.4  0.8  33.7 4.3  27.3 3.5 
1997 6.6  0.8  37.1 4.3  30.5 3.5 
1998 6.9  0.7  41.8 4.6  34.9 3.8 
1999 8.1  0.8  44.0 4.6  35.9 3.7 
2000 6.9  0.6  52.0 4.8  45.2 4.1 
2001 6.3  0.5  56.4 4.8  50.1 4.2 
2002 7.2  0.6  61.6 4.7  54.4 4.2 




Figure 4 - Evolution of the number of federal civil servants 
(actives and retired): Brazil - 1995-2002 







Active Employees 981,9 975,8 958,2 897,9 931,1 927,4 896,0 852,9 
Retired and Pensioned  802,7 859,6 875,9 912,7 926,3 931,9 937,4 940,4 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002* 
(Thousands) 
 
Federal system  
 
The federal civil servant pension scheme is 
the most imbalanced among the three levels 
of government. Its dependency ratio is less 
than 1, seriously undermining its financial 
sustainability. Accordingly, its reform is a 
top priority for the federal government. 
 
As shown in figure 4 in recent years the 
number of federal civil servant retirees and 
pensioners has increased sharply while the 
number of active employees has decreased. 
Thus the system can no longer be sustained 
by payroll contributions, and requires urgent 
adjustments to avoid growing public 
deficits.  
 
The age structure of current civil servants 
does not bode well for alleviating the 
pension deficit: only 29 percent of federal 
employees are under 41. Moreover, the 
average age of new federal employees has 
been rising, from 31 in 1995 to 35 in 2002.  
Nearly half of federal civil servants are aged 
between 41 and 50, and a quarter is in the 
retirement range (51 and over). As a result 
the number of new retirees is expected to 
increase over the next few years. 
 
Table 6 Average monthly pension benefits for federal civil servants and private employees, 
2002                                                                                                                                             (R$) 
Professional category  Benefit 
Federal civil servants 
Executive branch   2,171 
Federal judges  11,862 
Central Bank  6,662 
Armed forces  4,024 
Legislative branch  6,969 
Judiciary branch  7,308 
Private employees (pay as you go system) 
Average pension by age 
a  713 
Average pension by length of service 
b 232 
Average pension of pay as you go system  362 
a. Provided at age 70 (men) or 65 (women), independently of length of service.  
b. Provided after 35 years of service (men) or 30 years of service (women). 
Source: Brasil, Ministério da Fazenda, 2003.  
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  Figure 5: Civil Servant Pension Deficit as a Share of 
the Public Fiscal Revenues in the Brazilian 
States:  2000  2000 
SOURCE: MPAS 
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Another issue is the high heterogeneity of 
civil servant benefits across professional 
categories. Table 6 shows the average 
pension benefit for different groups of 
federal civil servant retirees and for private 
workers registered with the pay as you go 
system. While the average pension benefit 
for federal judges is five times that for 
retirees from the executive branch, the 
benefit for federal executive-branch civil 
servants is almost 10 times that for retirees 
based on length of service under the PAYG 
system. But some of the groups receiving 
generous benefits (such as judges, the armed 
forces, and members of Congress) have 
considerable political power—inhibiting the 




As noted, relative to the federal government, 
state governments spend a smaller share of 
fiscal revenues to finance the civil servant 
pension deficit. There are many reasons for 
that: (a) States started their civil servant 
pension systems at different times. So, while 
some states have older systems with large 
deficits, many have young systems without 
deep actuarial imbalances; (b) Some states 
began implementing civil servant pension 
reforms in the late 1990s and are now in 
better financial shape then others; c) 
Different rules about benefits and 
contributions in each system have 
influenced the evolution of the balance 
between spending and income.  
 
Figure 5 shows civil servant pension deficits 
as a share of fiscal revenues in Brazilian 
states. In some, such as Rio Grande do Sul, 
Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, 
and Goias, the share of deficit spending is 
higher than that by the federal government. 
In others, such as Tocantins, Rondonia, and 
Acre, the deficit does not compromise too 
many public revenues.  
 
In 2000 the 26 (excluded Tocantins State 
that was created in the end of last decade) 
Brazilian states had 2.6 million active civil 
servants and 1.0 million retirees (see table 
2). Only 8 states had dependency ratios of 
less than 2 under their civil servant pension 
systems, and all were among the richest 
states (figure 6). Many northern, 
northeastern, and midwestern states do not 
face short-term risks of financial crises in 
their civil servant systems. So, despite the 
need for measures to restructure the system 
and avoid future imbalances, the 
considerable heterogeneity among states  
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Figure 6: Dependency Ratios on the Civil Servant 
Pension System by State: Brasil 2000
Source: MPAS 2000 
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makes it difficult to align the opinions of 
state authorities when it comes to civil 
servant pension reform.  
 
Municipal systems  
 
Municipal civil servant pension systems 
were created and expanded later than the 
federal and state systems. There is little 
timely information on the total number of 
beneficiaries of municipal systems. The first 
of these systems, created in state capitals, 
have 332,000 active civil servants and 
138,000 retirees and pensioners. The 
dependency ratio of these systems (2.4) is 
much more comfortable than those at the 
federal and state levels. 
 
Many municipalities, however, are 
increasingly using the PAYG system for 
their employees. Table 7 shows the 
distribution of public employees in the civil 
servant and pay as you go systems by 
government level. 
 
Municipalities contract fewer employees 
under the civil servant system because 
federal rules discourage them from doing so, 
based on the argument that using the PAYG 
system will help ensure the long-run 
sustainability of their local administrations. 
Even so, some municipal governments are 
running deficits under the PAYG system due 
to fiscal imbalances, falling tax revenues, 
and cash shortages.  
 
 
Table 7 - Pension system coverage for public employees by government level 
1999 (percent) 
Share of employees  Share of payroll  Government level 
Civil servant 
system 




Pay as you go 
system 
Federal  86.9 13.1 93.3 6.7 
State 66.7  33.3 88.8 11.2 
Municipal  54.4 45.6 71.5 28.5 
Source: Brasil, RAIS/MTb (several issues)   
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Municipal deficits under the civil servant 
pension scheme are smaller than those at the 
federal and state levels. In 2000 only 3 
percent of municipal revenues were used to 
cover these deficits—much less than at the 
federal and state levels (see table 5).  
 
The 2000 Fiscal Responsibility Law 
introduced new rules to discipline municipal 
and state spending on public pensions. The 
law imposed new obligations in areas such 
as transparency, long-term planning, 
financial and actuarial balance, and periodic 
publication of the financial state of pension 
system accounts.  
 
The administration of President Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso also introduced many 
other changes to promote fiscal discipline 
and prevent the creation of new civil servant 
pension systems. (More than half of 
municipalities do not have such systems.) 
The new rules are crucial to the 
sustainability of existing systems, and 
include: 
 
•  Prohibiting workers from collecting 
more than one public pension. 
•  Providing the same benefits as under the 
PAYG system. 
•  Separating accounts for health 
expenditures and pension benefits. 
•  Forbidding systems from making loans 
to civil servants. 
•  Limiting net spending for retirees and 
pensioners to 12 percent of municipal 
income. 
•  Creating municipal pension funds to 









In December 2003 the Brazilian Congress 
approved a parametric civil servant pension 
reform (constitutional amendment 41). This 
section describes the debate that preceded 
the amendment’s approval and the changes 
it introduced. 
 
The Brazilian Partido dos Trabalhadores 
(Workers Party) won the most recent (2002) 
national elections. The new president, Luis 
Ignacio (Lula) Silva, was elected based on 
his opposition to the “neoliberal” reforms 
implemented by former President Cardoso. 
Civil servants, as a group, have always been 
among the strongest supporters of the 
Workers Party and were a crucial part of the 
social alliance that led to Lula’s election. 
Civil servants expected that any further 
reforms would reduce their social privileges, 
undermine their political power, or both. 
 
But in an internally and externally adverse 
environment, it is sometimes difficult for a 
government to sustain the privileges of 
interest groups—no matter what its political 
debts. Six months before the elections, 
Brazil’s economy experienced hard times. 
The risk rate for foreign investments 
skyrocketed due to uncertainty about future 
economic policies. To ease this uncertainty, 
Lula’s government has had to demonstrate 
its commitment to macroeconomic stability 
and public deficit control. 
 
To prove these commitments in the long run, 
the government had to pursue an agenda of 
reforms, focusing on two sectors: pensions  
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(especially civil servant pensions, to reduce 
public deficits) and taxes. These were the 
main battles facing Lula’s government in 
2003, with high risks of losing political 
support.  
 
Since January 2003 the new government has 
been trying to reach national consensus on 
the need for pension reform. President Lula 
has argued that civil servant pension reform 
is crucial to achieving social justice and 
balancing public accounts. During 2002 the 
federal civil servant pension system spent 
R$33 billion on fewer than 1 million 
beneficiaries, while the pay as you go 
system spent R$88 billion (less than 3 times 
more) on 18 million beneficiaries (more than 
18 times more). In 2002 federal, state, and 
local governments spent R$62 billion on 
benefits for retired civil servants. But 
payroll contributions for civil servants were 
just R$7 billion—generating a deficit 
estimated on R$55 billion. 
 
Given this situation, President Lula’s 
government has defined three main goals for 
civil servant pension reform: (i) achieving 
better balance in the system and 
guaranteeing long-run stability, (ii) reducing 
social imbalances in the use of public funds 
by providing larger income transfers to the 
poorest families, and (iii) reducing pressures 
to cover system deficits and freeing public 
resources to support economic growth. 
Based on these goals, in March 2003 the 
president and the governors of 27 states 
endorsed the Brasilia Charter, which: 
 
•  Elaborates joint proposals to reform civil 
servant pension schemes at the federal, 
state, and municipal levels, seeking to 
reverse the systems’ actuarial and 
financial imbalances. 
•  Proposes new rules for benefits 
(minimum age, minimum time working, 
and so on). 
•  Provides for government contributions 
equivalent to the minimum contributions 
of active civil servants. 
•  Imposes a ceiling on benefits for civil 
servants (or different ceilings based on 
professional category and government 
level). 
•  Creates complementary pension funds 
for public employees as a way to 
increase the pension value over the 
ceiling value. 
•  Supports studies at the state level to 
evaluate the impact of these measures on 
the system’s equity and sustainability.  
 
To build the alliance needed to approve 
these measures in Congress, Lula’s 
government had to deal with many special 
interest groups and engage in political 
debates in many institutional arenas.  
 
In the executive branch the main actors were 
the Ministry of Presidential Cabinet, 
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Social 
Security and the Ministry of Planning, 
which helped advance the proposed changes. 
Other parts of the federal government were 
silent, and some indicated their unhappiness 
with the proposals. In a strategic move, the 
government proposed the reforms only for 
civil servants, excluding the armed forces. 
 
In the legislative branch the actors were 
members of Congress. The government 
party (Workers Party) was split into groups 
for and against the reforms. But opinions 
were also divided in other parties. The 
strategy of the government leadership in 
Congress was to create a punitive 
environment for any member of the Workers 
Party who did not support the reforms, and 
to develop alliances and bargaining tools 
with members of other parties to generate 
support. 
 
In the judiciary branch there was clear-cut 
opposition to the proposed reforms— 
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especially by magistrates and judges, who 
will see their privileges cut as a result. 
 
State governors were generally in favor of 
the reforms, and municipal mayors were not 
called on to participate in the process. 
 
Within civil society there was enormous 
opposition by active civil servants, who are 
directly affected by the increased length of 
service required to receive benefits and the 
reduction in the value of their future 
pensions. Retirees were also opposed, 
because the reform reduces the value of their 
benefits. Given that active civil servants, 
retirees, and pensioners represent 6.4 million 
persons and each is able to influence two 
other adults, there was a potential of 20 
million voters opposed to the pension 
reforms. Moreover, almost all are among the 
richest fifth of the Brazilian population and 
have a strong capacity to influence public 
opinion. 
 
Although the main arena of debate was 
Congress, another important arena was the 
mass media (press, television, and so on), 
where the public opinion debate—which 
was decisive in influencing the behavior of 
members of Congress—took place. 
 
In April 2003 the government sent Congress 
the constitutional amendment proposal (PEC 
40-2003) on pension reform. In August the 
Deputies chamber approved an alternative 
amendment (PEC 40A-2003), but in the 
Brazilian bicameral system this amendment 
had to be approved by the Senate to be 
enacted into law. The Senate introduced 
some changes and approved it in October. 
Based on these changes the combined 
Congress approved a new amendment (PEC 
41-2003) in December 2003. The changes 
introduced by the amendment have 
consequences for the following actors. 
 
 
Pensioners and retirees 
 
•  Current retirees and pensioners 
(including those who have rights to claim 
benefits) will contribute the same payroll 
tax as active civil servants (11 percent), 
except for those under the ceiling for 
income tax exemption. 
 
Active civil servants (when retired) 
 
•  Will pay the same payroll tax as paid as 
during employment (11 percent), except 
for those under the ceiling for income tax 
exemption. 
 
•  Federal judicial system civil servants 
will receive a pension ceiling equivalent 
to the highest salary received by a 
Supreme Court minister. For state 
judicial system civil servants, the ceiling 
will be equivalent to 90.25 percent of the 
higher salary of a Supreme Court 
minister. 
  
•  Regular retirement age will increase 
from 53 to 60 (men) and from 48 to 55 
(women). Minimum length of service to 
retirement did not change: 35 years 
(men) and 30 years (women). Men and 
women can still retire younger than the 
regular retirement age at 53 (men) and 
48 (women) with 35 years and 30 years 
of service, respectively. But in both 
cases a reduction factor will be applied 
to the benefit value equivalent to 5 
percent for each year until 60 (men) and 
55 (women). In other words, the benefit 
value for those retired at 53 (men) and 
48 (women) will be equivalent to 65 
percent of the last salary received before 
retirement. This new rule creates 
economic incentives for later retirement. 
  
•  To count the length of service period as 
35 years of contributions in private or 
public pension schemes, at least 20 years  
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of contributions must be in public 
schemes and 5 years in the last civil 
servant position. 
 
•  Will keep the right to claim, for length 
of service retirement, 30 years (men) and 
25 years (women) of service for civil 
servants hired before December 1998. 
 
•  Civil servants hired before December 
1998 that achieve the requirements of 
regular retirement age and minimum 
length of service will receive pensions 
equal to the last salary received before 
retirement (benefit integrity principle). 
They will also get parity in readjusting 
their pensions with the salaries of active 
civil servants. 
 
Future civil servants 
 
•  Will have their benefits calculated 
according to the contributions effectively 
completed (including in the pay as you 
go system). 
 
•  If federal, state, or municipal 
governments create complementary 
pension funds, civil servants will have 
the rights to contribute in order to 
complement benefit values when their 
salaries are over R$2,400. 
 
•  Will contribute, when retired or 
pensioners, the same payroll tax as 
active civil servants (11 percent), except 
for those under the ceiling for income 
tax exemption. 
 
•  Will be subject to the ceilings and sub-
ceilings established by law, including for 
accumulated received benefits. 
 
•  Pension value for pensioners will be the 
same as for retirees until the limit of 
R$2,400, plus 70 percent of the amount 
beyond this limit.  
 
•  Will lose the right of parity between 
pensions and salaries of active civil 
servants. 
 
•  Governments at all levels will create 
complementary pension funds for civil 
servants. Those funds will be publicly 





•  Will be subject to the ceilings and 
subceilings established by law, including 
for accumulated received benefits. 
 
Police and firemen 
 
•  Will be subject to the ceilings and 
subceilings established by law, including 
for accumulated received benefits. 
 
•  Pension value for pensioners will be the 
same as for retirees until the limit of 
R$2,400, plus 70 percent of the amount 
beyond this limit.  
 
•  Can no longer use the length of service 
time declared by affidavit basis to count 
toward retirement (for current and future 
civil servants).  
 
For all those insured in the pay as you go 
system 
 
•  Ceiling of contributions and benefits 
increases from R$1,200 to R$2,400. 
 
•  Coverage of safety and occupational 
health revert to the Ministry of Social 









Many topics related to the new 
constitutional amendment on pension reform 
will continue to raise complaints among 
certain groups of civil servants. For 
example, most judges on the Brazilian 
Supreme Court do not agree that is 
acceptable to collect payroll contribution for 
retirees. But on the other hand, the 
government has argued that the civil servant 
pension scheme is based on solidarity, not 
capitalization. For this reason the payroll 
contribution can be paid indefinitely as a 
tax, including by retirees.  
 
Another polemical point of the newly 
approved reforms is the breach of contract 
on acquired rights for active civil servants 
expecting to retire in the next few years. 
This is particularly unfair when compared 
with the transitional rules for private 
employees implemented by the 1998 
pension reform. Many political actors 
consider this breach of the rules a flagrant 
case of disrespect for acquired rights. 
 
Finally, while public sector pension reform 
was the government’s most urgent and 
difficult task, deficits in the private pension 
system must also be addressed. These 
deficits are growing, especially because 
benefits vary proportionally with annual 
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